Roma Rights 2012: Challenges of Representation: Voice on Roma Politics, Power and Participation
22nd, August, 2013
Options of Roma Political Participation and Representation
This paper seeks to provide a critical overview of the main discourses of Roma and pro-Roma organisations in the last two decades and to develop an analytical framework for studying national and international forms of political participation and representation.
One can observe a shift in the focus of dominant discourses of Roma and pro-Roma organisations. (1) In the 1970s and 1980s claims of self-determination were at the forefront; (2) from the 1990s until the early 2000s the focus shifted to human rights violations; (3) from the late 2000s the social and economic integration of Roma has been the main priority.2
(1) The self-determination approach underscores the importance of recognising that Roma are different, and advocates a form of autonomy. Roma may enjoy either (i) territorial or (ii) personal autonomy.
(i) Territorial autonomy would imply that a certain territory where Roma form the majority of the population is invested with jurisdiction over a substantial number of minority issues and exercises this jurisdiction in its own responsibility. As far as I am aware, there exists no such territorial form of Roma autonomy. There are several settlements where Roma form the majority of the population (for instance in Gadna in Hungary, or in the Šuto Orizari district of Skopje in Macedonia); however, they do not enjoy special collective rights, and the mayors and local self-governments have the same rights and duties as all the others in that country.
There have also been attempts to create a country for the Roma (Romanestan). Such claims have been advanced either by self-appointed “Gypsy kings” or extreme right-wing nationalist politicians/activists who wish to get rid of the Roma living in their country.
(ii) Personal or non-territorial autonomy appears to be more suited for dispersed Romani communities. This form of autonomy is granted on the basis of membership of a minority, not residence. Probably the most well-known functioning non-territorial autonomy is enjoyed by the ethnic and national minorities in Hungary, including the Roma. The real challenge for political theory and institutional design is to determine whether such a non-territorial form of autonomy is desirable and feasible on a transnational level.
(2) The human rights approach promotes the civic equality and the protection of the fundamental rights of Roma. Accordingly, Roma are to be fully integrated into mainstream political and social institutions.
The human rights or anti-discrimination approach is appropriate for minorities that were involuntarily excluded from common institutions on the basis of perceived race or ethnicity. However, numerous minorities are in the opposite position: they have been involuntarily assimilated, stripped of their own language, culture and self-governing institutions.3 These groups need counter-majoritarian protections not solely in the form of anti-discrimination and undifferentiated citizenship, but rather in the form of various group-differentiated minority rights.4
On the whole, at the bottom of the hierarchy of minority rights is the principle of non-discrimination and of equal rights. The next step is special, group-differentiated rights, which take into account the differences of minority members, and can be granted as individual or collective rights. If the collective rights amount to some form of essential self-determination (political, cultural, other) they become autonomy. Autonomy can be either territorial or personal.5
(3) The focus on the social inclusion of Roma has grown out of the critiques of the (i) self-determination and (ii) human rights approaches.
(i) Approaches focusing on self-determination and minority rights have been criticised for downplaying the issues of segregation and exclusion from common institutions, such as schools, workplaces, hospitals, etc. Having the right to establish Roma schools does not facilitate overcoming the exclusion of those Roma students who would like to attend mainstream mixed schools and/or classes.
Furthermore, the discourse of self-determination may be easily interpreted as contributing to the ethnicisation of social problems, thus undermining inter-ethnic solidarity.
The promotion of some essential “difference” between “Roma” people and everyone else in society exploits traditional prejudices and low expectations. “Difference” is used to explain Roma impoverishment, social tension and conflicts, migration, and the failure of “integration” initiatives. It conserves the political isolation of “Roma” people and supports the ideology of segregation.6
Moreover, it is cheaper to promote the ethnic difference of Roma than to improve the living conditions of the masses of Roma who have lost their jobs and to provide access to decent education, housing and health care.
(ii) In return, it is common to criticise the human rights/anti-discrimination discourse for neglecting economic and social processes other than discrimination that contribute to the marginalisation of Roma. Focusing exclusively on discrimination forces a very simplistic vision of social relations, blaming only the prejudiced majority. Such an approach is insensitive to the diversity of local inter-ethnic relations, as well as human rights violations within Romani communities: for instance, domestic violence, human trafficking and usury.7
Furthermore, extreme (and even moderate) right-wing political forces may exploit such simplifying approaches, turn them inside-out, and blame the Roma for increasing crime, aggression and other social ills. Attributing social disadvantages to racism also diminishes the elite’s responsibility, by blaming popular prejudices for their failure to act.8
National and European policy-makers gradually realised that the misery of huge proportions of Roma cannot entirely be explained by racism. Following the collapse of communism and the restructuring of national economies, most Eastern European Roma suddenly fell out of the legal labour market and started gradually sliding out of society. The neo-liberal transition led to the formation of an underclass, i.e. both economically and socially excluded populations being locked outside civil society and class structure.9
(iii) Each of the three waves of Roma strategies (EU pre-accession, Decade of Roma Inclusion, EU Framework Strategy) has aimed at the social and economic inclusion of Roma. Each initiative has attempted to improve the coordination, monitoring and financing of national strategies.10
Concentrating on “the poverty of [the] geographically concentrated post-transitional rural and suburban underclass [to] which the majority of EU’s Roma population is directly subject to or indirectly threatened by”11 is a legitimate and vital policy focus. Developing the isolated and extremely poor micro-regions in Eastern Europe is a crucial policy objective and will hopefully improve the living conditions of many Roma.
However, not all the difficulties faced by Romani communities throughout Europe are related to the post-communist transition. The recent EU Framework Strategy explicitly excludes “the complex phenomena of ethnicity-based discrimination [and] issues of migration”12 and implicitly excludes the social difficulties of all other “Roma” groups, those who do not live in impoverished post-communist regions, such as itinerant groups struggling for adequate stopping places or Ashkali immigrants forced into concentration camps such as the campi nomadi in Italy – to mention only two blind spots.
Furthermore, aiming for common European objectives may result only in attaining the lowest common denominator. For instance, the EU Framework Strategy aims to ensure that all Roma finish primary school, a very modest objective, which most EU countries have already accomplished, and should rather aim at increasing the number of Roma students in secondary and tertiary education.13
Moreover, identifying Roma with misery and social exclusion reproduces precisely those stereotypes that contribute to the exclusion of Roma. Associating Roma with unemployment and calling for their social assistance stigmatises the whole group as a “social burden” and may lead to dangerous policies aiming at disciplining “workshy” Roma.14
Options of national-level political participation and representation
The pyramid of rights can be translated into options of political participation. (i) At a fundamental level, Roma participate in any given political community on the basis of their formal political equality. Such a colour-blind approach relegates ethnic differences to the private sphere and advocates the individual equality of each citizen.
Accordingly, Romani citizens participate in the demos on the same footing as any other citizen. They have supposedly the same claim in the distribution, control and exercise of political power as any other member of the political community. As equal citizens, they participate in elections, and can also be elected as representatives.
However, in practice, such a citizenship regime does not seem to provide for the political participation and representation of Roma. Studies suggest that Roma are largely underrepresented on local, national and European levels.15 Considering their proportion in the general population, there should be dozens of Romani MPs across Eastern Europe. Instead, in 1999 Bárány counted five MPs of Roma origin in the whole of Eastern Europe who were elected on their own or on the lists of mainstream parties.16 For instance, in Slovakia (where Roma are estimated to make up 9-10 % of the population) no Romani candidate was elected to the parliament till 2012.
Colour-blind citizenship regimes may allow ethnic/minority organisations to participate in local and national elections either as political parties or as associations. For instance, in Bulgaria parties based on ethnic identity are constitutionally forbidden to register; nonetheless, it is possible to register as a political party if the organisation does not explicitly disclose its ethnic focus (as in the case of Free Bulgaria and the Democratic Congress Party, both having a predominantly Romani membership).17
Only those Romani parties managed to secure seats in the national legislatures that allied themselves with mainstream parties and risked becoming their satellites. Overall, the number of Roma elected to national parliaments either on mainstream or on Roma party tickets has been minimal, far below their demographic proportion.
While there is no visible progress in terms of parliamentary representation, the situation is more encouraging on the local level, as there are now Romani mayors and councillors in all the Central European countries except Poland. In Romania, for example, the number of elected Romani members of local councils grew from 106 in 1992 to 136 in 1996 and 160 in 2000.18
Romani citizens may also further their interest in non-electoral forms such as private bodies (associations, foundations, charities)19 and public bodies (consultative and expert bodies, governmental agencies, etc.), and via so-called traditional leaders. As for private bodies, Klímová identified 120 registered Romani associations and foundations in the Czech Republic, 280 in Hungary, six to ten in Poland, 150 in Romania, and almost fifty in Slovakia.20 Romani citizens may also engage in informal activism, and take part in demonstrations, social movements and online political organising.
Most Eastern European states have established public bodies to deal with the “Roma issue”. These Roma-specific organisations include inter-ministerial commissions and committees, a plenipotentiary or secretary of state, personal advisors to the prime minister or president, ministerial coordinators, etc. All these Roma-specific institutions have only advisory and consultative functions.
Both Roma and non-Roma may work in such public bodies. Although they are typically appointed as civil servants, they are also supposed to represent Roma and give voice to their interests. The non-electoral and electoral fields may also be linked. In the 2000 Romanian elections, a Romani MP from the Roma Party gained a seat (in addition to the reserved one) through a coalition agreement with the Social Democratic Party, which also guaranteed the Roma Party the posts of Adviser on National Minorities Issues in the Presidency Office and the Head of the Office for Roma Issues, with the title of Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Public Information.21
As for traditional Roma leaders (such as vajda and bulibasha), they were historically appointed by local authorities to take charge of keeping order and collecting taxes in Romani communities. There still exist such traditional leaders, whose status is usually dependent on charisma and wealth and passes from father to son. In addition to local leaders, one can find in Romania the self-appointed King (Florin Cioabă), Emperor (Iulian Rădulescu) and President (Bercea Mondialu) “of all Roma”. Such leaders are recognised only by a handful of followers, although some authorities still see them as negotiating partners, thus giving them an aura of legitimacy.
Some of the traditional leaders find their way into electoral politics and become members of local governments or fill positions in national or supranational bodies. Cioabă, for instance, formed the Christian Centre of Roma party, and ran – unsuccessfully – in the 2000 national elections for the Chamber of Deputies, but was elected as a representative on the Sibiu City Council and is also the President of the Plenary Assembly of the European Roma and Travellers Forum. It is important to emphasise the fact that most Roma regard such leaders, even if elected, with aversion and find their actions detrimental to Roma.22
(ii) Some countries accord special rights to minorities, to facilitate their political participation and representation. In Romania a seat in the lower chamber of the parliament has, since 1990, been reserved for a Romani representative. Each representative occupying the reserved seat has come from the Roma Party (now officially called Roma Party Pro-Europe, Partida Romilor Pro-Europea).
The system of reserved seats for Roma representatives in national or local assemblies has been tried in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. However, the system does not preclude the election of more than one MP. In the 2008 Romanian parliamentary elections two Roma were elected for the first time: one was elected for the reserved seat, and another was elected on the list of a mainstream party.23
Other electoral techniques intended to improve the political representation of minorities include exemption from certain electoral rules (such as the minimum threshold), the over-representation of defined ethnic/national regions, race-conscious districting, and quotas for party lists.24
(iii) Roma enjoying a form of autonomy have an additional sphere of political participation and representation. In particular, in Hungary minorities enjoy collective rights in the fields of education, media, culture and the use of minority languages. The bearers of collective rights are minority self-governments on the local and national level, which are intended to be partners to local self-governments and the national government respectively.
The powers of local minority self-governments include the right to ask for information, make a proposal, initiate measures and object to a practice or decision related to the operation of institutions that violate the rights of the minority; such a self-government can define within its authority the circle of protected monuments and memorial sites, its own name, medals and decorations, and the holidays and festivities of the minority; it can establish institutions, companies, schools, media, or scholarships; most importantly, it must give its consent to any act of the local government affecting the minority population in their capacity as such.
Each minority group can establish one national minority self-government or national assembly. These represent the interests of the local minority self-governments on the national level. The local is not subordinated to the national level, and nor are local minority self-governments obliged to report to the national one. The national assemblies have similar powers to the local minority self-governments, but with a national scope.
The following table recapitulates the options of state-bounded political participation of Roma in both electoral and non-electoral arenas.
Options of transnational political participation
The “Roma issue” has also emerged in the international, above all European, political arena. Citizens of Romani origin have a range of options for participating in international/European politics that may fit into the above tripartite scheme.
(i) Similarly to any other members of democratic polities, citizens of Romani origin are supposed to be represented in international politics principally by their own state. Bilateral and multilateral agreements are drafted, agreed upon, ratified and implemented by bodies of participating states. International organisations have also been founded by and are primarily composed of states.
Ram – based on her empirical study – found that, indeed, most Romani activists and leaders had little interest in gaining international attention or in lobbying on the international level for improving their rights. Some Romani activists explicitly told her that it is not civic associations that should speak with the EU, but that it is the role of their government.25
However, as demonstrated above, Roma are not adequately represented on the national level, and so their respective states are not likely to represent their interests in the international arena. Romani citizens may seek non-electoral forms of transnational political participation or engage in the only existing form of international electoral politics, the European Parliament.
The European Parliament has been actively involved in the struggle against the discrimination and social exclusion of Roma. The first MEP of Romani origin was Juan de Dios Ramírez Heredia, who was elected three times on the party list of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party in 1987, 1989 and 1994. From Eastern Europe, Viktória Mohácsi was elected in 2004 on the list of the Hungarian Alliance of Free Democrats, and Lívia Járóka was elected in 2004 and 2009 on the list of the Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Union.
The Romani MEPs have played a vital role in putting the plight of Roma on the EU’s agenda, as well as in the drafting and adoption of various EU level resolutions and recommendations,26 including the recent EU Framework Strategy for Roma Inclusion.
It is to be noted that EU citizens can only vote for national party lists; therefore citizens of Romani origin cannot vote for individual Romani candidates. However, the underrepresentation of Roma in the European Parliament appears to be even more severe than in most national legislative bodies, as currently only one out of 736 members is of Romani origin.
(ii) Granting special political rights to Roma on a transnational level appears to be a utopia at the moment. However, there are several plans for reforming the European electoral system. Introducing a Roma quota on national party lists of Member States with a significant Romani population is one option to improve the representation of Romani citizens. It is theoretically also possible to have reserved seats for stateless minorities/nations in the European Parliament. Furthermore, if European political parties were allowed to form and their candidates were allowed to run in elections, Romani candidates might also consider forming their own European party.
(iii) Having a transnational form of autonomy would imply that Romani citizens living in various states could have jurisdiction over a substantial range of issues pertaining to them. This would essentially entail a form of self-determination and self-governance of dispersed stateless groups.27
Meyer argues that Roma have a legitimate claim to transnational autonomy, being a transnational non-territorial minority that has been persecuted for centuries.28 A special status of transnational minority may provide protection from the discriminatory treatment by national states under which they have suffered for so long, as well as de jure statelessness resulting from the disintegration of multi-ethnic Eastern European countries.29 As for the institutional setting of transnational autonomy, Meyer remains vague:
Although it is not easy to see how the special status of being a trans-national minority could be incorporated into the existing present-day legal frameworks, there can be no doubt that the efforts of the Roma to gain trans-national cultural and political autonomy is a legitimate aspiration. In the light of the Saami experience, gaining such autonomy is best seen as a long-term goal whose realization presupposes, inter alia, the success of the Roma in establishing democratically legitimate elected bodies of representation.30
Klímová, relying on the national-cultural autonomy concept of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer and the agonistic patriotism of Ephraim Nimni, argues for transnational cultural autonomy for indigenous and Romani communities.31 She notes that the two groups have three characteristics in common: (1) they have a strong sense of feeling different or even separate from the majority societies that surround them, and – unlike national minorities – they still operate under their own laws and customs outside those of the majority society; (2) they have dispersed settlement patterns; (3) they are severely alienated, due to the treatment from majority societies.
Referring to the deep mistrust between majority societies and Roma, Klímová argues that “internal citizenship-based solutions” are not feasible. “The citizenship rights fail to do justice because they emanate from a state that has subordinated the Romani and indigenous laws, autonomy and forms of political organization. They are merely an instrument of absorption and assimilation.”32 As an alternative, Klímová embraces the radical vision of deterritorialisation of all nations promoted by Nimni:
If the roof that each nation seeks becomes non-territorial, if each nation can be sovereign without claiming exclusive territorial control, the infusion of politics with culture and nationalism on its own is not dangerous. If territory cannot become an exclusive property of a particular ethno-national group, we do not need to fight over it. If we have no minorities and majorities, we do not need minority protection.33
It appears that the drive for trans-state forms of autonomy – of both scholars and activists – is largely driven by mistrust towards state legislation and policies based on negative experiences. Minority rights are granted by, dependent on, and often misused by state authorities. As a consequence, several Romani activists are seeking a form of self-determination and self-government outside the mechanisms of state.
This paper has analysed three discourses that have been embraced by Roma and pro-Roma organisations and initiatives in the last two decades focusing on human rights, self-determination (minority rights) and social inclusion. The article also presented an analytical framework for analysing electoral and non-electoral forms of political participation on national and international levels.
The minority rights (and cultural autonomy) approach is clearly inadequate to promote the social inclusion of Roma. In a similar manner, Roma-specific policies or strategies without effective education, employment and social policies, providing tangible and equal social rights for every citizen, are bound to remain hollow.
The recognition of Romani culture and identity, as well as the historical disenfranchisement of Romani populations, is no less urgent. However, given the prejudice and discrimination that Romani citizens face in various spheres of life, the Romani recognition struggle should aim for both (legal, political and social) equality and the freedom to identify oneself and live as Roma. As long as non-Romani citizens can overwrite one’s choice of identity (i.e. stigmatise someone as “gypsy”), the struggles for democratic equality and recognition cannot and should not be disentangled.
The idea of Romani self-determination has been debated on the grounds of either questioning the social reality of the Roma nation or emphasising its reactive character. Acknowledging the dangers of developing a homogenising and reactive national identity, the struggle for the recognition of the Roma nation should not be dismissed altogether; rather, a dynamic and open conception of the Roma nation should be embraced, one that allows for multiple identities, experimentation and voluntary assimilation. Romani citizens should have the opportunity to recollect, negotiate, develop and reaffirm their own identity and culture.
Romani cosmopolitan claims originate from experiences of exclusion and hostility either in their “home country” or as immigrants and asylum seekers in a “receiving country”. It implies the rejection of the universal nationalist programme (according to which each individual belongs to one homogenous nation that is to be protected by a nation-state) and the demand for a global or European legal order guaranteeing the liberty, self-determination and fundamental rights of Romani citizens throughout the world without the mediation of states.
However, offering the example of a stateless Roma nation to the rest of humanity may be interpreted as replacing the demos with ethnos, thus promoting a non-territorial version of universal nationalism. The general vision of deterritorialisation of all political communities is neither feasible nor desirable. On the other hand, dispersed nations and diasporas, such as the Roma, could enjoy supplementary non-territorial cultural autonomy, similar to the Hungarian model, but on the European level. Accordingly, the EU could provide the legal framework for transforming the European Roma and Travellers Forum into a genuine European Roma Parliament, with sufficient power and resources to effectively exercise trans-state non-territorial cultural autonomy.
The allegedly most advanced existing form of transnational democracy, the European Union, remains underdeveloped. Its complex deliberative, decision-making and governance structures are dominated by Member States. The rights of EU citizens remain obscure and fragile, and their direct access to EU bodies is very limited. The targeted expulsion of Romani immigrants from France in the summer of 2010 tragically demonstrated the limitations of European rights. Moreover, the European electoral system does not allow for counterbalancing the political marginalisation of Romani citizens. On the contrary, it further reduces the political weight of the Roma, since only one or two MEPs are supposed to represent the largest “European minority”, comprising 10-12 million European citizens.
Bárány, Zoltan. “Ethnic Mobilization without Prerequisites: The East European Gypsies”. World Politics 54 (2002) 3: 277-307.
Bárány, Zoltán. The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality and Ethnopolitics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Brunner, Georg, and Herbert Küpper. “European Options of Autonomy: A Typology of Autonomy Models of Minority Self-Governance”, in Kinga Gál, ed., Minority Governance in Europe. Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2002.
Klímová-Alexander, Ilona. “Transnational Romani and Indigenous Non-Territorial Self-Determination Claims”. Ethnopolitics 6 (2007) 3: 395–416.
Klímová, Ilona. “Romani Political Representation in Central Europe. An Historical Survey”. Romani Studies 12 (2002) 5.
Kóczé, Angéla. “Civil Society, Civil Involvement, and Social Inclusion of the Roma”. Roma Inclusion Working Papers. Bratislava: UNDP Europe and the CIS Bratislava Regional Centre, 2012.
Kovats, Martin. The Politics of Roma Identity: between Nationalism and Destitution 2003 [cited 2 October 2011].
Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Majtényi, Balázs, and Balázs Vizi, eds. A Minority in Europe. Selected International Documents Regarding the Roma. Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 2006.
McGarry, Aidan. “Ambiguous Nationalism? Explaining the Parliamentary Under-Representation of Roma in Hungary and Romania”. Romani Studies 19 (2009) 2: 103–124.
McGarry, Aidan. Who Speaks for Roma?: Political Representation of a Transnational Minority Community. New York: Continuum, 2010.
Meyer, Lukas H. “Transnational Autonomy: Responding to Historical Injustice in the Case of the Saami and Roma Peoples”. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 8 (2001) 2–3.
Ram, Melanie H. “Interests, Norms and Advocacy: Explaining the Emergence of the Roma onto the EU’s Agenda”. Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics 9 (2010) 2: 197–217.
Reynolds, Andrew. “Electoral Systems and the Protection and Participation of Minorities”. Minority Rights Group International, 2006.
Rorke, Bernard. Beyond First Steps. What Next for the EU Framework for Roma Integration? Budapest: Open Society Foundation, Roma Initiatives Office, 2013.
Rövid, Márton. “One-Size-Fits-All Roma? On the Normative Dilemmas of the Emerging European Roma Policy”. Romani Studies 21 (2011) 1: 1-22.
Rövid, Márton. “Solidarity, Citizenship, Democracy: The Lessons of Romani Activism”, in Dieter Halwachs, ed., European Yearbook of Minority Issues. Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012.
Rövid, Márton, and Angéla Kóczé. “Pro-Roma Global Civil Society: Acting for, with or instead of Roma?”, in Mary Kaldor, Henrietta L. Moore and Sabine Selchow, eds., Global Civil Society 2012: Ten Years of Critical Reflection. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
Szalai, Júlia. “Az elismerés politikája és a cigánykérdés”, in Ágota Horváth, Edit Landau and Júlia Szalai, eds., Cigánynak születni. Budapest: Aktív Társadalom Alapítvány – Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, 2000.
Szelényi, Iván, and János Ladányi. Patterns of Exclusion: Constructing Gypsy Ethnicity and the Making of an Underclass in Transitional Societies of Europe. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
Vermeersch, Peter. The Romani Movement: Minority Politics and Ethnic Mobilization in Contemporary Central Europe. Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 2006.
List of abbreviations
CPRSI Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
EP European Parliament
ERIO European Roma Information Office
ERPC European Roma Policy Coalition
ERRC European Roma Rights Centre
ERTF European Roma and Travellers Forum
EU European Union
IRU International Romani Union
MG-S-ROM Committee of Experts on Roma and Travellers within the Council of Europe
MEP Member of the European Parliament
MP Member of Parliament
NGO Non-governmental organisation
OSF Open Society Foundations
PER Project on Ethnic Relations
RNC Roma National Congress
- Márton Rövid is a research and advocacy officer at the Decade of Roma Inclusion Secretariat Foundation. In 2012 he earned a PhD in political science at Central European University. In the course of his doctoral research, he studied cosmopolitan theories and the notion of transcendence of national citizenship in the light of the case of Roma, an allegedly non-territorial nation. His research interests include: theories of cosmopolitan democracy, global civil society, transnational social movements, international politics of multiculturalism, the Romani movement.
- Márton Rövid, “One-Size-Fits-All Roma? On the Normative Dilemmas of the Emerging European Roma Policy”, Romani Studies 21 (2011) 1: 1-22.
- Often-cited examples are the Catalans, or the Hungarian communities living in Hungary’s neighbouring countries.
- Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 90.
- Georg Brunner and Herbert Küppe r. “European Options of Autonomy: A Typology of Autonomy Models of Minority Self-Governance”, in Kinga Gál, ed., Minority Governance in Europe (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2002), 17.
- Martin Kovats, The Politics of Roma Identity: between Nationalism and Destitution 2003 [cited 2 October 2011].
- Márton Rövid and Angéla Kóczé, “Pro-Roma Global Civil Society: Acting for, with or instead of Roma?”, in Mary Kaldor, Henrietta L. Moore and Sabine Selchow, eds., Global Civil Society 2012: Ten Years of Critical Reflection (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
- Kovats, The Politics of Roma Identity.
- Iván Szelényi and János Ladányi. Patterns of Exclusion: Constructing Gypsy Ethnicity and the Making of an Underclass in Transitional Societies of Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
- Rövid and Kóczé, “Pro-Roma Global Civil Society”.
- Working Document on the EU strategy on the social inclusion of Roma, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Rapporteur: Lívia Járóka, 28. 9. 2010.
- For an overview of the limits and potentials of the EU Framework for Roma Integration, see Bernard Rorke, Beyond First Steps. What Next for the EU Framework for Roma Integration? (Budapest: Open Society Foundation, Roma Initiatives Office, 2013).
- Júlia Szalai, “Az elismerés politikája és a cigánykérdés”, in Ágota Horváth, Edit Landau and Júlia Szalai, eds., Cigánynak születni (Budapest: Aktív Társadalom Alapítvány – Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, 2000).
- Zoltán Bárány, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality and Ethnopolitics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Ilona Klímová, “Romani Political Representation in Central Europe. An Historical Survey”, Romani Studies 12 (2002) 5, Peter Vermeersch, The Romani Movement: Minority Politics and Ethnic Mobilization in Contemporary Central Europe (Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), and Aidan McGarry, “Ambiguous Nationalism? Explaining the Parliamentary Under-Representation of Roma in Hungary and Romania”, Romani Studies 19 (2009) 2: 103–124.
- Zoltán Bárány, “Ethnic Mobilization without Prerequisites: The East European Gypsies”, World Politics 54 (2002) 3: 277-307.
- Bárány, The East European Gypsies, 213.
- Klímová, “Romani Political Representation in Central Europe”, 119.
- For a critical overview of civil society involvement in the social inclusion of Roma, see Angéla Kóczé, “Civil Society, Civil Involvement, and Social Inclusion of the Roma”, Roma Inclusion Working Papers (Bratislava: UNDP Europe and the CIS Bratislava Regional Centre, 2012).
- Klímová, “Romani Political Representation in Central Europe”.
- Klímová, “Romani Political Representation in Central Europe”, 117.
- For instance, the biggest Romanian Romani party (Partida Romilor Pro-Europea) refuses to take part in the work of the European Roma and Travellers Forum as long as Florin Cioabă chairs its Plenary Assembly. http://www.ertf.ro/viz/About%20ERTF/10-0/en.
- Aidan McGarry, Who Speaks for Roma?: Political Representation of a Transnational Minority Community (New York: Continuum, 2010), 91.
- Andrew Reynolds, “Electoral Systems and the Protection and Participation of Minorities”, Minority Rights Group International, 2006.
- Melanie H. Ram, “Interests, Norms and Advocacy: Explaining the Emergence of the Roma onto the EU’s Agenda”. Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics 9 (2010) 2: 201.
- For a detailed overview of all Roma-related international documents, see Balázs Majtényi and Balázs Vizi, eds., A Minority in Europe. Selected International Documents Regarding the Roma (Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 2006).
- Márton Rövid, “Solidarity, Citizenship, Democracy: The Lessons of Romani Activism”, in Dieter Halwachs, ed., European Yearbook of Minority Issues (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012).
- Lukas H. Meyer, “Transnational Autonomy: Responding to Historical Injustice in the Case of the Saami and Roma Peoples”. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 8 (2001) 2–3.
- Ibid., 300: the breakup of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia left thousands of Roma stateless, as the citizenship laws of the new countries discriminated against them.
- Ibid., 301.
- Ilona Klímová-Alexander, “Transnational Romani and Indigenous Non-Territorial Self-Determination Claims”, Ethnopolitics 6 (2007) 3.
- Ibid., 399.
- Ibid., 411.