REPORT

on the circumstances of the double murder committed at Tatárszentgyörgy on 23 February 2009 and conduct of the acting authorities (the police, ambulance and fire services)

7 May 2009
Budapest
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC)
1386 Budapest 62, P.O. Box 906/93, Hungary
Phone: (36-1) 413-2200; Fax: (36-1) 413-2201
E-mail: office@errc.org http://errc.org

Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities (NEKI)
1447 Budapest Pf. 510.
Tel/Fax.: (06-1-) 303-8973; (06-1-) 314-4998
mail: info@neki.hu www.neki.hu

Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ)
1084 Budapest, Víg utca 28. I. Em. 3.
Tel/Fax: (06-1) 209-0046, 279-0755
E-mail: tasz@tasz.hu www.tasz.hu
Foreword

The Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities (NEKI), the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ) and the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), civil rights advocacy organisations, have jointly conducted an on-site fact-finding operation in Tatárszentgyörgy. The purpose of this operation was to obtain a more accurate overview of the circumstances of the double murder that took place there on 23 February 2009 and to assess the legality of the conduct of the authorities present at the scene. We are alarmed by the conduct of the authorities at the scene, the manner in which they have subsequently addressed the case in press releases, and the fact that they have still not provided the public with any useful or substantive information regarding the case. We also consider it a cause for alarm that no information has been released concerning the nature and results of any disciplinary proceedings implemented by the authorities against the head of criminal investigations and the fire and arson investigator, or about any other measures taken, despite the fact that nearly two months have passed since disciplinary proceedings were ordered.

It is also objectionable, from the point of view of all Hungarian citizens, that in the aftermath of such a serious crime – presumably a hate crime motivated by ethnic prejudice – the police fail to provide any information as to the specific measures or preventive programmes it plans to draw up and implement in order to stop the reoccurrence of crimes of this nature.

In order to prepare this report, we have relied on testimonies collected from eyewitnesses, family members and locals, and on official statements made by the authorities. We have also drawn on the relevant legal provisions.
I. What happened in Tatárszentgyörgy on the night of 22 and 23 February 2009? The facts

As a result of the fact-finding operation carried out by the civil rights advocacy organisations, and based on the accounts of family members and neighbours, it is has emerged that the following events took place:

After midnight on the night of 22 to 23 February 2009, Renáta J, the companion of one of the victims and the mother of the other victim, who was resting at home at the time, heard loud bangs. Later these were identified as having come from Molotov cocktails thrown at their house. First she heard the sound of two sharp reports, and then heard a third when she had already run out of the house with her son, Máté. After the first two bangs, Róbert Cs., the life partner of Renáta J., grabbed Robika and Bianka, their two eldest children, holding Robika tightly to his chest and carrying Bianka outside on his side. They were shot at while they ran outside, at which point he presumably either put down or dropped Bianka, who then ran back into the house. After that, when Renáta was taking Máté, their third and youngest child, out of the house, the little girl also managed to get to the neighbour’s house.

Mrs. Márton P., the neighbour, heard three shots at around 00.15am. The woman looked out of the window but could not make anything out because of the darkness. (The street lighting in the village ends at the house of the Cs. Seniors – the parents and grandparents, respectively, of the victims. There is no street lamp near the house of the Cs. Junior family, which is the building next door.) Shortly after the three shots were fired, she heard screams. She switched on the light on the outside of their house, and it was then that Mrs. Csaba Cs. (the mother of Róbert Cs., one of the victims) and Renáta J. reached their house. Robika, as well as, the other two children were carried inside. They saw bloody wounds on Robika: his face, forehead and lips all bore signs of injury. At the time, they did not realise that the injuries were caused by gunshot; it did not even occur to them, as they had never seen gunshot wounds before. The boy had been found by Richárd Cs., the father’s brother.

Mrs. Csaba Cs. saw that there was no electricity in their house, presumably because of the fire. It was past midnight when her son, Róbert Cs., was found; he was carried into the grandparents’ house.

The ambulance, police and fire services were called by Mrs Márton P. and Csaba Cs. Based on the data retrieved from Mrs P.’s mobile phone, this was at 00.40 am. First, the police arrived, at around half past one (media personnel from the local Dabas TV station were there before the police), and then the fire brigade. More than five policemen arrived at the scene. Finally, at around 2 o’clock, the ambulance service arrived, with one vehicle. When she had called the ambulance service, Mrs P. had specifically asked for a fully equipped ambulance, as there were multiple injuries. The rescue vehicle which initially arrived at the scene was minimally equipped, with one male medic (or paramedic). The medic (or paramedic) first examined Robika, and then said he was going back to the ambulance car for his medical bag. Instead, he went to the other house to see the injured father, and only returned to the child some 20 minutes later. At this point, according to the relatives, he spent about 5 to 6 minutes trying to revive him, after which he declared the boy dead.
According to Mrs. Csaba Cs., her son, too, was still alive when the ambulance car arrived: he was unconscious, but breathing. The medics put Róbert Cs. into the ambulance, where he died. Afterwards, they wanted to leave the body on the ground next to the grandparents’ house, asking the senior Cs family for a blanket to cover the body. The family instead asked the medics to take him back to the hospital. Later another ambulance arrived, along with a vehicle with a doctor. No family doctor was on the scene, only the doctor on call from Örkény. Finally, Bianka and Máté were taken away by ambulance. Róbert Cs. and Robika were pronounced dead and were taken away, but not by the medics. The injured persons were undressed by the medical personnel, and their wounds were revealed. The family was told that the cause of death was suffocation and poisoning due to smoke inhalation. There was no sign of burn injuries on anyone. The doctor on call told the family that foul play could not be ruled out. There was no mention of this in the autopsy report, although the box “authority proceedings considered necessary” was ticked by the doctor.

The policemen, including István Kocsis, deputy-head of the Dabas Police, examined the injured persons. He also saw the victims and told the family that the injuries were caused not by shooting but by an explosion triggered by the fire. Mrs P. told both the police and the firemen that she had heard shots; but she was told by the firemen that she had probably misinterpreted the sounds of explosions caused by the fire. It is to be noted that the only item in the burnt-out house that could have exploded was the gas canister, but that was removed intact from the house by the firemen. Mrs P. also told the firemen that military shooting exercises were frequent in the area, and so she knew the sound of shooting when she heard it and she believed that she could not have mistaken some other sound for it.

The police from Dabas only inspected the burnt-out house. They left at around 6.00am, and they only took an empty gas container that they found near the house. They returned to Tatárszentgyörgy when Csaba Cs. called at 08.00am to report that at first light they had found empty shot cartridges outside the house. The police returned with a car. Csaba Cs. showed them some cigarettes butts and some footprints further away from the house, at which point one of the policemen urinated on one of the footprints (an action that the authors of this report consider capable of amounting to a criminal offence). The policeman said that he suspected the cartridge cases had been put there by the family. They also told the police that they had found shot pellets in Bianka’s clothing, but the police did not seem to take note of this.

The site around the house was only secured with tape by the police returning from Dabas when Viktória Mohácsi, a Member of the European Parliament, appeared at the house at around 09.30am and called the police to account for their actions. István Kocsis was present at the site at this time too, and attempted to convince Ms Mohácsi that this was not a murder case, and that the injuries must have been caused by nails sticking out of objects that had fallen off due to the fire. Ms Mohácsi called the National Investigation Bureau (NNI), asking them to intervene in the matter. The investigators immediately went to the site with two minibuses and took the inspection process over from the local Dabas police. They spent the whole day there, not finishing the inspection work until past nightfall. They cordoned off an area of about 15m diameter. They found the bottles used for the Molotov cocktails (which they had already seen at night), as well as lead shot and shot cartridges. The firemen were then called back out to the site. It was only then that they collected some materials to investigate the cause of the fire, and they took away some material including some wooden planks. The following day, NNI officials returned to the scene to continue their work by inspecting the area around the house, including the woods behind the building.
No records were made of the eyewitness accounts given the scene, but after finishing the inspection work on 23 February 2009, NNI investigators questioned Lídia H., a representative of the local Roma Minority Council, and József D. According to the family, the neighbours living on the edge of the village, further away from the house, were not questioned during the data-gathering process, even though they would also have been aware of, and may well have witnessed, the incident.

Several people reported having seen, more than once before the time of the murders, a black X5 BMW SUV vehicle in the area. The car was parked nearby, and they assumed that those inside were watching something or somebody.

The burnt-out house was insured. The local council has provided aid to the family to assist in covering the costs of the funeral and the National Roma Council (OCÖ) has also contributed financially. The family believed that they had not received information from the Victim Protection Service, so they did not ask for financial aid. The civil rights advocacy organisations, during our visits, gave the relevant forms to the families and took the completed forms to the Bács-Kiskun County Victim Protection Service in Kecskemét. There it was confirmed that they had already received emergency aid from the Pest County office of the service and that the indemnity was on its way. The relevant application for aid of the Victim Protection Service was presumably delivered to the persons concerned at Tatárszentgyörgy with the assistance of the local council, which the family may have interpreted as their having received support from the local council.

**Medical documents available on the Jakabs:**

Closing medical reports

Máté Cs. was taken to the Heim Pál Hospital on suspicion that he was suffering the effects of smoke inhalation from the fire in house. He was kept there for observations, but the initial suspicions were unfounded. (Closing medical report: 24/2/2009.) Bianka Cs. was also taken to the Heim Pál Hospital. Her closing medical report indicates a gunshot wound and injuries to the right ring-finger and pelvis (Heim Pál Hospital closing medical on 23/2/2009).

Renáta J. was taken to the emergency department of the Péterffy Sándor Hospital on suspicion of mild smoke poisoning as a consequence of an “explosion of unknown origin”. She spent three hours there and received no medication. She asserts that she was not suffering from smoke poisoning, and that neither were the other two children. Afterwards, she was next to Máté and Bianka in the hospital, where all she received was a single pill of Algopyrin when she complained of a headache. There was no question of giving her some kind of tranquilliser, even after the closing medical report of the Heim Pál Hospital had indicated that Bianka had sustained gunshot wounds and it was known that her partner and one of her sons had been murdered. The health institutions concerned did not offer psychological assistance to Renáta J., according to her account and the silence of the medical report (Heim Pál Hospital medical closing report of 23/2/2009).

Coronary certificates

Róbert Cs.
Recorded after an autopsy by Dr Imre C., physician (date missing):
Immediate cause of death: “loss of blood”, “shot injury to heart and lung”, “pellet gunshot wound inflicted by another person”

The doctor examining the corpses before autopsy (Dr. Béa Ileana) recorded as the reason for the examination: “death suffered in home fire. Skin-puncture injuries on upper left body of approx. 0.5 cm in diameter”. Authority proceedings considered necessary.

Robika Cs.
Recorded by Dr. Imre C. as well upon autopsy:
Immediate cause of death: “loss of blood”, “brain injury”, “shot wounds to skull”, “shot wounds from a lead-shot firing weapon used by another person”,

Notes made at the time of examining the dead (Dr. B.): “death suffered in home fire, injuries on chin, upper lip, injuries on forehead, chest and left hand.”

II. Evaluation of the measures taken by the acting authorities

Evaluation of measures taken by the police

Legal background:

A police officer is obliged to act or to initiate action if he notices any fact, circumstance or action that represents an offence or threat to public safety, or if any such issue comes to his knowledge (Police Act, Subsection 1 of Section 13). Clearly, the obligation to act does not apply exclusively in the event that there is a well-founded suspicion of crime.

The police have the legal power to prohibit or prevent the site of a crime, minor-offence, accident or other incident from being changed. (Police Act, Section 43)

Securing the site is an activity of the police that is implemented on the site of a crime or other incident (e.g. an accident) before, during and, if needed, after site inspection, with the aim of protecting and closing off the site and of protecting any physical evidence. The police representative securing the site keeps back the witnesses, removes any unauthorised personnel from the site, sets out the parameters of the site, retains the site in its original condition and immediately reports the incident to his immediate superiors. (Service Regulations, Section 22)

Measures must be taken to close off the site in the event, inter alia, of a crime or an accident. (Service Regulations, Section 27)

The police officer is obliged to immediately report to the official in charge at the relevant police authority any death taking place in public areas or death taking place in private homes under irregular circumstances, and is obliged to secure the site concerned until the inspecting committee of the relevant police authority arrives at the scene. (Service Regulations, Section 32.)

Police conduct on 23 February 2009:

Fire and injured persons were reported in the call to the police. When they arrived at the scene, the police had information to the effect that the roof structure of a family home was on
fire, and that there were several seriously injured persons. Two of those persons, who both had visible bleeding wounds later died whilst police were present. The third injured person was a child.

The victims were found by their relatives 6-8 metres from the entrance to the house – not in it. The victims had not sustained any burn marks.

After the police arrived, they were told that the neighbours had heard gunshots. The medical personnel attending to the victims could not clearly specify the cause of the injuries. According to the fire and arson investigator, the fire had started in the attic.

The police completed the inspection in the burned-out house, and took away a gasoline canister from the yard, but left the broken glass that had been found next to the entrance door, together with a cork. The police did not inspect the immediate vicinity of the house.

The police officer at the site was only in a position to know the opinion of the fireman present, and not the result of the fire and arson investigation. As far as police measures are concerned, it is irrelevant whether the firemen think there was a crime or not, or what the latter say about the causes of the fire. Any opinion expressed by the firemen on the site is only relevant without further fire-related examination to the extent that it enables a decision to be made as to whether the building may, once the fire has been extinguished, be accessed without any further safety concerns.

Based on the above, the police, on arriving at the scene, should have closed off and secured the area, and not only the house, even if the firemen active at the site allegedly said that an electric fire was the cause of the destruction. Closing off and securing measures are usually implemented by the official in charge or the unit leader on site once the case is reported to headquarters.

The possibility of a criminal offence (homicide) could not be ruled out, so the police were obliged to secure the scene, seek out witnesses and start the process of collecting data. Even if the situation was regarded as a “mere” accident, the site ought to have been secured. This was not done.

With regard to securing a site, it is the police officer in charge who decides about the size of the area to be closed off. In the case of homicide, it is recommended that an area around the site of the crime be sealed off in accordance with the specific characteristics of the area. The closed area cannot be entered by anyone without permission from the supervisor of the site inspection process, and the details of any entrants are to be recorded. The site inspection process can only be interrupted for serious reasons. In the case of injuries caused by gunshots, the place from which the shooting took place must be identified. When securing evidence, all remnants of gunpowder need to be located, and these should not be left at the site of the crime.

When the family called the police in the morning following the incident to report that they had found lead shot lying about, the police did return to the scene, but they did not secure it immediately and the area that was eventually closed off was not big enough.

In Tatárszentgyörgy the sealed-off area of 10-15 metres in diameter was extremely small and therefore unsuitable for securing the evidence left by the perpetrators at the scene. An area of
at least 100 metres ought to have been secured, and the dirt roads leading to the scene ought to have been sealed off and examined. Further, a sniffer dog could have been used to locate the material that had been brought in to set the house on fire, and aerial photographs could have been taken of the scene in order to visually record evidence, but seemingly none of this took place.

We have no information as to whether any suspicion of homicide was officially reported by the Dabas Police to the Pest County Police Headquarters, but it is probable that it was not, given that at the scene, deputy chief of police István Kocsis declared that no crime had occurred – even after the cartridges had been found. If suspicion of a crime arises in relation to a case of death, then this must immediately be reported to the county Police Headquarters. (The police at the scene report to Dabas, Dabas reports to the relevant county headquarters and the county police report to the ORFK, the National Police Headquarters). The investigation of a case of homicide falls under the authority of the county police.

Not even after the arrival of the NNI investigators was an area of 100m in diameter or larger closed off around the site. We understand that, even after the NNI investigators had finished inspecting the site, journalists found lead shot in the nearby bush, which suggests that physical evidence had not been adequately secured.

**Evaluation of the conduct of the fire brigade, the ambulance service and the doctor on call**

According to information supplied by the family and published in the press, the fire brigade provided misleading information on the scene regarding the cause of the fire. Subsequently, in the information provided by the police when the forensic autopsy confirmed manslaughter, the police refused to accept responsibility partly on the basis of this information.

Based on the statement given by Zoltán Velikovszki, head of the fire brigade of Dabas, on the evening of 23 February 2009, the first investigation had found that “electricity may have been the cause”. He indirectly blamed the family for the mistake made by the fire brigade, saying “we were annoyed that we found a 10-litre gasoline container next to the building, but I was unable to obtain any information as to whether it belonged to the owner or whether it had not been on the scene prior to the incident.” (RTL Klub Evening News)

According to the information provided on the same day by the spokesperson of the National Directorate General For Disaster Management: “no other information was received that would exclude from the investigation the causes identified by the Dabas Fire Brigade.” (MTV Kékfény)

In other words, in the communication of the fire brigade the statement that “an electric short-circuit caused the fire” was toned down to the milder “electric fire cannot be excluded as the cause”.

In respect of the actions of the ambulance service, we found that it took them an unreasonably long time to arrive at the scene. The spokesperson of the National Ambulance Service said the following in a television programme “they came as fast as they could” (TV2 Tények éjszaka (News at Night) 24.02.2009.)
Pál Győrfi, spokesperson, said the following: “an ambulance and another vehicle with a paramedic arrived at the scene.” (MTV Kékfény 23.02.2009.) From this it can be deduced that there were no physicians in either vehicle. The physician on call arriving at the scene started the post-mortem at around 3 o’clock. The victims were fully dressed. This suggests that the emergency personnel did not undress the injured persons and did not examine their bodies for injuries.

The doctor on call did describe the injuries in the coronary certificates; however, she claimed that the cause for the examination was death caused by a house fire. She indicated that an official procedure was necessary which, according to the law, is obligatory in the case of deaths under unusual circumstances – for example, in cases of death by poisoning or accidental death or where no data is available that might provide a reasonable basis for identifying the circumstances of death, but this was not separately indicated by the physician in writing. If, according to the physician conducting the post-mortem, a criminal act is suspected, a forensic autopsy must be ordered instead of an official procedure in accordance with the rules of criminal proceedings. (Sections 217-218 of Act CLIV of 1997)

The pathologist who identified the cause of death on the coronary certificate is included in the list of forensic medical experts, which means that the forensic autopsy took place in a timely manner.

**Evaluation of the investigations that were launched in relation to the events that took place on 23 February 2009**

On 26 February 2009, Dr. Sándor Ármos, head of the Pest County Police Headquarters, ordered disciplinary proceedings to be taken against the officer in charge of the investigation and the head of the crime-scene inspection committee on the grounds of unprofessional work.

The Government ordered an investigation to evaluate the work of the police, the fire brigade and the ambulance service. On 11 March, a Government spokesperson provided information about the report that was prepared with the participation of three ministries. According to the report, the fire brigade and the ambulance service acted professionally, although both units took longer to get to the scene than was reasonable. The Minister of Health initiated an investigation into the causes of this. Based on the information provided, disciplinary action was also taken against the fire and arson investigator, because he appears to have determined the cause of the fire without adequate care, before the fire and arson investigation had been completed – that is, he made assumptions about the cause of the fire, and he only ordered an investigation by an independent fire protection expert two days later.

Based on the report, the head of the criminal department at Dabas violated the rules of on-site investigations.

The text of the report was never made public.

**Evaluation of the communication by the police**

On the morning of 23 February 2009 the Pest County Police Headquarters issued a brief statement claiming that the fire in Tatárszentgyörgy, in which two people had died, had been caused by a short-circuit based on the preliminary fire and arson investigation. After the result of the autopsy became available, their statement in the afternoon changed to the effect that “it
appears that the 28-year-old Róbert Cs., together with his 4-year-old son who was in his arms, was shot with a hunting rifle while attempting to escape from their burning house.” A few days later, reports came out claiming that the personnel of the Dabas Police Headquarters had made a mistake, and that disciplinary action had been taken against them. At that time, the police did not mention the misleading information provided by the fire brigade and the physician performing the post-mortem. The fire brigade has consistently refused publicly to take responsibility for its own actions and has not acknowledged any wrongdoing on its part.

The public was informed of the disciplinary actions taken but not of their results.
To date, we do not know the precise cause of the fire.
To date, we do not know why the ambulance took longer to arrive than it should have done, and why there was no physician on the scene.
To date, we do not know the result of the disciplinary action taken against the fire and arson investigator.
To date, we do not know if anyone has been held properly accountable for their conduct.

Additional comments

On 1 April 2009, one of the civil organisations that had prepared the report asked – with relevant authorisation and in the context of proceedings instigated by Renáta J. at the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) – that the IPCC, in order to acquire information about the case, should obtain from the relevant bodies and make available the notes of the on-site inspection performed by the personnel of the Dabas Police and the NNI after the events that took place on 22-23 February 2009, together with the full reports prepared by the Dabas Police and the NNI. Based on the information available to date, for the first request of the IPCC the police refused to release the documents. They since resubmitted the request for information and documents but the police has not yet provided any feedback, answer to this second request.
III. Recommendations to the authorities by the reporting civil organisations

1. Since the conduct of the authorities violated statutory regulations on several counts, we demand that the results of the subsequent disciplinary actions be disclosed, that the authorities clarify the steps they took to investigate the serious professional and procedural errors, and that they hold the relevant persons accountable. Furthermore, we demand information as to what steps have been taken in relation to the additional measures that were ordered (e.g. offering training for rescue operators in order to improve communication with persons who report an emergency, obligatory training for persons performing a post-mortem).

2. We demand that substantive and factual information be provided to the public regarding the circumstances of the case and the possible perpetrators. The police must draw up and publish a clear criminal profile so that the public can assist in apprehending the perpetrators as soon as possible.

3. We demand that the police do not exclude but, instead, take into account the likelihood of racist, anti-Roma motives during the investigation. The police must learn about and apply international guidelines, protocols and good practices related to racially motivated crimes, on which a summary can be found in Annex attached to the report. We request the police to develop and apply a procedure for investigating hate crimes based on the referred international standards.
ANNEX
on the international guidelines, protocols and good practices related to racially motivated crimes

International guidelines, protocols and good practices related to racially motivated crimes:

The relevant decisions of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the effective tackling of hate crimes. In several cases, the Court of Strasbourg found the proceeding countries to be in violation of the law (Nachova and Others v Bulgaria no. 43577/98 and 43579/98., Secic v. Croatia no. 40116/02; Cobzaru v. Romania no. 48254/99) and declared that when investigating violent crimes, authorities must take all reasonable steps to identify potentially racist motives and to determine whether hate or prejudice based on ethnic discrimination played a role in the perpetration of the crime. The Court emphasized that treating racially motivated violence and brutality in the same manner as non-racially motivated violence and brutality would mean that we ignore the special nature of these crimes – crimes that are especially pernicious from the point of view of basic rights.

In its General Policy Recommendation no. 11, the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) operating under the auspices of the European Council formulatess the following recommendations for the participating countries in respect of the role of the police in combating racist crimes and monitoring racist incidents:

- To ensure that the police thoroughly investigate racist offences, including by fully taking the racist motivation of ordinary offences into account;
- To establish and operate a system for recording and monitoring racist incidents, and the extent to which these incidents are brought before the prosecutors and are eventually classed as racist offences;
- To encourage victims and witnesses of racist incidents to report such incidents;
- To these ends, to adopt a broad definition of racist incident: For the purposes of this Recommendation, a racist incident is: “any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person.”

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in the Maastricht decision accepted in 2003 and the Cordoba declaration of 2005, underlines the obligation of the participating countries to prepare and implement a methodology, and a data gathering and monitoring system that complies with international standards in order to effectively investigate hate crimes.

The OSCE emphasizes in several of its publications the importance of the role of the investigative authorities as an important component in effectively combating hate crimes. If hate crimes are treated by the investigative authority as ordinary crimes, it fails to investigate and take into account evidence that indicates a hate crime, and the special motivation will not be taken into account when the punishment is determined. Several countries cooperated with the OSCE to draft guidelines that provide recommendations for the police organisations of a given country about how to recognise and investigate hate crimes. The OSCE has also held

2 Examples of these are the Practical Guide to the Statutory Regulations on Hate Crimes, and the OSCE Law Enforcement Officer Program on Combating Hate Crimes)
special training courses in several participating countries. Representatives from the Hungarian police forces also participated in a similar training in 2005.

There are several practical examples of the effective handling of such crimes:

In the United Kingdom, the Metropolitan Police have established what are known as Community Safety Units, which specifically explore and investigate hate crimes. The units cooperate with civil organisations and the public in their work, which includes preventive measures, investigation and victim protection. The police officers serving in the units receive special training – including information about the local culture – in order to be able to handle hate crimes immediately, with special expertise and so effectiveness.

The FBI has also established working groups that specialise in hate crimes (Hate Crimes Working Groups) and that draw up comprehensive protocols for individual US states. The FBI trains and provides expertise to the local law enforcement officers in various states, regarding specific cases. The FBI and the local law enforcement professionals cooperate closely with local and national civil organisations.

The American Anti-Defamation League a civil organisation which cooperates with the FBI to combat hate crimes, in the framework of its L.E.A.R.N.\(^3\) programme, provides training to the police in the following key areas: definition of hate crimes, recognizing signs and symbols, criminal profiles, elements of a crime, hate crime criteria, effect on the community, first response by the authorities after an alleged hate crime is reported, victim protection, interviewing, reporting, investigation strategies, and most frequently made mistakes.

\(^3\) [http://www.adl.org/learn/default.htm](http://www.adl.org/learn/default.htm); ADL’s Law Enforcement Agency Resource Network